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Abstract 
The relative majority rule and the unanimity rule are characterized for the case in which there are only 
two alternatives. The main axioms are motivated by a principle of binary representativeness: the 
aggregation of the preferences of n voters is the result of splitting the n voters into two groups, 
aggregating the preferences of the voters of each group, selecting for each group a representative that 
adopts the preference of the group, and finally aggregating the preferences of the two representatives. The 
two characterizations are shown to differ from each other in just one axiom, expressing strategyproofness 
(unanimity) or group strategyproofness (majority).  
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1. Introduction 
 
A collective decision can be considered democratic when the decision has enough 
support in the collective. When there are only two alternatives α and β involved, one 
may define α to have enough support if more individuals prefer α to β than β to α. This 
definition leads to the relative majority rule as a source for democratic decisions. 
Characterizations of this rule for the case of two alternatives have been provided by, for 
instance, May (1952, p. 682), Fishburn (1973, p. 58), Aşan and Sanver (2002, p. 411), 
Woeginger (2003, p. 91; 2005, p. 9), Miroiu (2004, p. 362) and Xu and Zhong (2009). 
Going from one extreme to the other, one may define α to have enough support only if 
it has maximum support. The adoption of this principle leads to the unanimity rule. In 
between, there are the different versions of the absolute majority rule, where enough 
support means having the support of some percentage p > 50% of the individuals; see 
Llamazares (2006) and Houy (2007) for characterizations of absolute majority rules. 
 
This paper provides characterizations of both the relative majority rule and the 
unanimity rule. Conceptually, the characterizations hinge on the principle of 
representative democracy, which is understood in the sense that the preference of a 
collective I can be obtained by aggregating the preferences of subgroups of the 
collective. It is also worth noticing that the two characterizations (see Proposition 3.8) 
differ from each other in just one axiom: whereas the specific axiom for the relative 
majority rule is a group strategyproof condition, it is an individual strategyproof 
property for the unanimity rule. 
 
 
2. Definitions and axioms 
 
Members of the set ℕ of natural numbers are names for individuals. A society is a finite 
non-empty subset of ℕ. The alternatives are α and β ≠ α. A preference over {α, β} is 
represented by a number from the set {−1, 0, 1}. If the number is 1, α is preferred to β; 
if −1, β is preferred to α; if 0, α is indifferent to β. A preference profile for society I is a 
function xI : I → {−1, 0, 1} assigning a preference over {α, β} to each member of I. For 
xI ∈ X, J ⊆ I and i ∈ I, xJ is the restriction of xI to J and xi abbreviates xI(i). For n ∈ ℕ, 
Xn is the set of all preference profiles xI such that I has n members. The set X is the set 
of all preference profiles xI such that I is a society. For I = {i, j}, a ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and b ∈ 
{−1, 0, 1}, (ai, bj) is the member xI of X2 such that xi = a and xj = b. 
 
Definition 2.1. A social welfare function is a mapping f : X → {−1, 0, 1}. 
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A social welfare function takes as input the preferences over {α, β} of all the members 
of any given society I and outputs a collective preference over {α, β}. Specifically, for 
xI ∈ X: (i) f(xI) = 1 means that, according to f, society I prefers α to β; (ii) f(xI) = −1, that 
society I prefers β to α; and (iii) f(xI) = 0, that society I is indifferent between α and β. 
For xI ∈ X and a ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, na(xI) is the number of members of the set {i ∈ I: xi = a}.  
 
Definition 2.2. The relative majority rule is the social welfare function μ : X → {−1, 0, 
1} such that, for all xI ∈ X: (i) if n1(xI) > n−1(xI), then μ(xI) = 1; (ii) if n1(xI) < n−1(xI), 
then μ(xI) = −1; and (iii) if n1(xI) = n−1(xI), then μ(xI) = 0. 
 
Definition 2.3. The unanimity rule is the social welfare function υ : X → {−1, 0, 1} 
such that, for all xI ∈ X: (i) if n−1(xI) = n0(xI) = 0, then υ(xI) = 1; (ii) if n1(xI) = n0(xI) = 0, 
then υ(xI) = −1; and (iii) otherwise, υ(xI) = 0. 
 
Definition 2.4. Given a social welfare function f and xI ∈ X\X1, the preference f(xI) is: 
 
(i) determinable by representatives of two subsocieties if, for some subsociety J 
of I, j ∈ I and i ∈ I\J, f(xI) = f(f(xI\J)i, f(xJ)j); and 
(ii) determined by representatives of two subsocieties if, for every subsociety J 
of I, there are j ∈ I and i ∈ I\J such that f(xI) = f(f(xI\J)i, f(xJ)j). 
 
When f(xI) is determinable by two representatives, the preference f(xI) can be explained 
as arising from the aggregation of preferences of two individuals representing two 
subsocieties (or districts) J and I\J. When f(xI) is determined by two representatives, the 
preference f(xI) is obtained no matter the subsocieties chosen. 
 
SPD. Strict preference is determinable by two representatives. For all xI ∈ X\X1, if f(xI) 
≠ 0, then f(xI) is determinable by representatives of two subsocieties. 
 
IND. Indifference is determined by two representatives. For all xI ∈ X\X1, if f(xI) = 0, 
then f(xI) is determined by representatives of two subsocieties. 
 
The asymmetric treatment of strict preference and indifference in SPD and IND 
presumes that indifference is less desirable than strict preference (for instance, because 
strict preference makes easier for the collective to select an alternative). IND requires 
that, if indifference is the outcome, then every possibility of obtaining a strict preference 
by redistricting has been exhausted. IND makes indifference robust: when indifference 
is the outcome, no other result could be obtained if two representatives must determine 
the collective preference. 
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3. Results 
 
Remark 3.1. μ satisfies SPD and IND. 
 
As regards SPD, if xI ∈ X\X1 and μ(xI) = a ≠ 0, then choose k ∈ I such that xk = a, so 
μ(xI\{k}) ∈ {0, a}. Then, with J = {k}, μ(μ(xI\J)i, μ(xJ)k) = μ(bi, ak) = a = μ(xI), because b 
∈ {0, a}. With respect to IND, let xI ∈ X\X1 and μ(xI) = 0. Choose J ⊂ I, j ∈ I and i ∈ 
I\J. If μ(xJ) = 0, then μ(xI) = 0 implies μ(xI\J) = 0. Hence, μ(μ(xI\J)i, μ(xJ)j) = μ(0i, 0j) = 0 
= μ(xI). If μ(xJ) = a ∈ {−1, 1}, then na(xJ) > n−a(xJ). In this case, μ(xI) = 0 implies na(xI\J) 
< n−a(xI\J), for which reason μ(xI\J) = −a. Thus, μ(μ(xI\J)i, μ(xJ)j) = μ(−ai, aj) = 0 = μ(xI). 
 
Remark 3.2. υ satisfies SPD and IND. 
 
Since υ(xI) = a ≠ 0 implies that, for all i ∈ I, xi = a, it is evident that υ satisfies SPD. 
Concerning IND, let xI ∈ X\X1 and υ(xI) = 0. Choose J ⊂ I, j ∈ I and i ∈ I\J. To prove 
that IND holds, it is enough to show that {υ(xI\J), υ(xJ)} = {1, −1} or that 0 ∈ {υ(xI\J), 
υ(xJ)}. If, for some i ∈ I, xi = 0, then either i ∈ J or i ∈ I\J. Consequently, υ(xI\J) = 0 or 
υ(xJ) = 0. If, for all i ∈ I, xi ≠ 0, then there must be j ∈ I and k ∈ I\{j} such that xj = 1 
and xk = −1. If {j, k} ⊆ J, υ(xJ) = 0. If {j, k} ⊆ I\J, υ(xI\J) = 0. If j ∈ J and k ∈ I\J, υ(xJ) 
∈ {0, 1} and υ(xI\J) ∈ {0, −1}. And if j ∈ I\J and k ∈ J, υ(xJ) ∈ {0, −1} and υ(xI\J) ∈ {0, 
1}. 
 
Lemma 3.3. With k ≥ 2, let f be a social welfare function such that f = μ on X1 ∪ … ∪ 
Xk. Then f = μ if and only if f satisfies SPD and IND. 
 
Proof. “⇒” Remark 3.1. “⇐” Taking the fact that f = μ on X1 ∪ … ∪ Xk as the base 
case of an induction argument, choose n > k and, arguing inductively, suppose that f = μ 
on X1 ∪ … ∪ Xn−1. To show that f = μ on Xn, choose xI ∈ Xn. Case 1: μ(xI) = 0. Suppose 
f(xI) = a ≠ 0. By SPD, there are J ⊂ I, j ∈ I and i ∈ I\J such that f(f(xI\J)i, f(xJ)j) = f(xI) = 
a. By the induction hypothesis, f(f(xI\J)i, f(xJ)j) = μ(μ(xI\J)i, μ(xJ)j). Therefore, μ(μ(xI\J)i, 
μ(xJ)j) = a. By definition of μ, a ∈ {μ(xI\J), μ(xJ)}. Without loss of generality, suppose 
that μ(xJ) = a. This means that na(xJ) > n−a(xJ). Since μ(xI) = 0 implies na(xI) = n−a(xI), it 
follows that na(xI\J) < n−a(xI\J), so μ(xI\J) = −a. But then a = μ(μ(xI\J)i, μ(xJ)j) = μ(−ai, aj) 
= 0: contradiction.  
 
Case 2: μ(xI) = a ≠ 0. As μ(xI) = a, there is k ∈ I such that xk = a. By definition of μ, 
μ(xI\{k}) ∈ {0, a}. Suppose f(xI) = 0. By IND, for every J ⊂ I, there are j ∈ I and i ∈ I\J 
such that f(f(xI\J)i, f(xJ)j) = f(xI) = 0. In particular, letting J = {k}, f(f(xI\{k})i, f(xk)k) = 0. By 
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the induction hypothesis, 0 = f(f(xI\{k})i, f(xk)k) = μ(μ(xI\{k})i, μ(xk)k) = μ(μ(xI\{k})i, ak). As 
μ(xI\{k}) ∈ {0, a}, μ(μ(xI\{k})i, ak) = a: contradiction. In view of this, f(xI) ∈ {a, −a}. 
Suppose f(xI) = −a. By SPD, there are J ⊂ I, j ∈ I and i ∈ I\J such that f(f(xI\J)i, f(xJ)j) = 
f(xI) = −a. By the induction hypothesis, f(f(xI\J)i, f(xJ)j) = μ(μ(xI\J)i, μ(xJ)j). Thus, 
μ(μ(xI\J)i, μ(xJ)j) = −a. By definition of μ, −a ∈ {μ(xI\J), μ(xJ)}. Without loss of 
generality, suppose that μ(xJ) = −a. This implies n−a(xJ) > na(xJ). Since μ(xI) = a, na(xI) > 
n−a(xI). As a result, n−a(xI\J) < na(xI\J), which means that μ(xI\J) = a. In consequence, −a = 
μ(μ(xI\J)i, μ(xJ)j) = μ(ai, −aj) = 0: contradiction.? 
 
Lemma 3.4. With k ≥ 2, let f be a social welfare function such that f = υ on X1 ∪ … ∪ 
Xk. Then f = υ if and only if f satisfies SPD and IND. 
 
Proof. “⇒” Remark 3.2. “⇐” Taking the fact that f = υ on X1 ∪ … ∪ Xk as the base 
case of an induction argument, choose n > k and, arguing inductively, suppose that f = υ 
on X1 ∪ … ∪ Xn−1. To show that f = υ on Xn, choose xI ∈ Xn. Case 1: υ(xI) = 0. Suppose 
f(xI) = a ≠ 0. By SPD, there are J ⊂ I, j ∈ I and i ∈ I\J such that f(f(xI\J)i, f(xJ)j) = f(xI) = 
a. By the induction hypothesis, f(f(xI\J)i, f(xJ)j) = υ(υ(xI\J)i, υ(xJ)j). Therefore, υ(υ(xI\J)i, 
υ(xJ)j) = a. By definition of υ, υ(xI\J) = υ(xJ) = a. This implies n−a(xI\J) = n0(xI\J) = n−a(xJ) 
= 0, so n−a(xI) = n0(xI) = 0. In view of this, υ(xI) = a: contradiction. Case 2: υ(xI) = a ≠ 0. 
By SPD or IND, there are J ⊂ I, j ∈ I and i ∈ I\J such that f(f(xI\J)i, f(xJ)j) = f(xI). By the 
induction hypothesis, f(f(xI\J)i, f(xJ)j) = υ(υ(xI\J)i, υ(xJ)j). By definition of υ, υ(xI) = a 
implies that, for all k ∈ I, xk = a. As a result, υ(xI\J) = υ(xJ) = a and υ(υ(xI\J)i, υ(xJ)j) = a. 
As a consequence, f(xI) = a = υ(xI).? 
 
Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 suggest that, given SPD and IND, the differences between 
unanimity and relative majority can be traced back to the way they aggregate 
preferences in societies with one or two individuals. In particular, any characterization 
of δ ∈ {μ, υ} on X1 ∪ X2 combined with SPD and IND will characterize δ. The results 
presented next make use of this possibility. 
 
PAR2. Pareto efficiency for societies with at most two members. For all xI ∈ X1 ∪ X2 
and a ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, if, for all i ∈ I, xi ∈ {a, 0} and, for some i ∈ I, xi = a, then f(xI) = a. 
 
VET2. No veto power for societies with two members. For all xI ∈ X2 and a ∈ {1, −1}, if 
I = {i, j}, then f(ai, −aj) ≠ a. 
 
The condition VET2 of no veto power is equivalent to Xu and Zhong’s (2009) simple 
equal treatment condition. 
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Given a social welfare function f, society I and a ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, define πa(I) to be the 
number of preference profiles xI such that f(xI) = a. 
 
FET2. Full equal treatment of outcomes in societies with two members. For every 
society I with two members, π−1(I) = π0(I) = π1(I). 
 
Lemma 3.5. A social welfare function f : X → {−1, 0, 1} satisfies PAR2 and either FET2 
or VET2 if and only if f = μ on X1 ∪ X2. 
 
Proof. “⇒” It is not difficult to verify that μ satisfies PAR2, FET2 and VET2. “⇐” By 
PAR2, for all a ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, i ∈ ℕ and j ∈ ℕ\{i}: f(ai) = a = μ(ai); f(ai, aj) = a = μ(ai, 
aj); f(ai, 0) = a = μ(ai, 0j); and f(−ai, 0j) = −a = μ(−ai, 0j). By either FET2 or VET2, f(ai, 
−aj) = f(−ai, aj) = 0 = μ(ai, −aj) = μ(−ai, aj).?  
 
Proposition 3.6. A social welfare function f satisfies SPD, IND, PAR2 and either FET2 
or VET2 if and only if f = μ. 
 
Proof. Lemmas 3.3 and 3.5.?  
 
UNA2. Unanimity for societies with at most two members. For all xI ∈ X1 ∪ X2 and a ∈ 
{−1, 0, 1}, if, for all i ∈ I, xi = a, then f(xI) = a. 
 
EQA2. Equal treatment of the two alternatives in societies with two members. For every 
society I with two members, π−1(I) = π1(I). 
 
DIC2. Non-dictatorship for societies with two members. For every society I with two 
members, there is no i ∈ I such that, for all xI ∈ X2, xi ≠ 0 implies f(xI) = xi. 
 
SSP2. Strong strategy-proofness for societies with two members. For all xI ∈ X2 and i ∈ 
I, there is no a ∈ {−1, 0, 1} such that ⏐f(ai, xI\{i}) − xi⏐ < ⏐f(xI) − xi⏐. 
 
GSP2. Group strategy-proofness for societies with two members. For all xI ∈ X2, there is 
no yI ∈ X2 such that, for all i ∈ I with xi ≠ 0, ⏐f(yI) − xi⏐ < ⏐f(xI) − xi⏐. 
 
Lemma 3.7. A social welfare function f : X → {−1, 0, 1} satisfies UNA2, EQA2, DIC2, 
and 
(i) GSP2 if and only if f = μ on X1 ∪ X2. 
(ii) SSP2 if and only if f = υ on X1 ∪ X2. 
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Proof. (i) “⇒” It is not difficult to verify that μ satisfies UNA2, EQA2, DIC2, and GSP2. 
“⇐” By UNA2, for all a ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, i ∈ ℕ and j ∈ ℕ\{i}, f(ai) = a = μ(ai) and f(ai, aj) 
= a = μ(ai, aj). Choose i ∈ ℕ and j ∈ ℕ\{i}. Let a ∈ {−1, 1}. If f(ai, 0j) ≠ a, then, as 
shown, f(ai, aj) = a, which contradicts GSP2. Consequently, for all a ∈ {−1, 1}, f(ai, 0j) 
= a = μ(ai, 0j). If f(1i, −1j) = 1, then, by EQA2, f(−1i, 1j) = −1, contradicting DIC2. If f(1i, 
−1j) = −1, then, by EQA2, f(−1i, 1j) = 1, contradicting DIC2. As a result, f(1i, −1j) = 0 = 
μ(1i, −1j) = 1. Given this, by EQA2, f(−1i, 1j) = 0 = μ(−1i, 1j). 
 
(ii) “⇒” It is not difficult to verify that υ satisfies UNA2, EQA2, DIC2, and SSP2. “⇐” 
By UNA2, for all a ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, i ∈ ℕ and j ∈ ℕ\{i}, f(ai) = a = υ(ai) and f(ai, aj) = a = 
υ(ai, aj). Choose i ∈ ℕ and j ∈ ℕ\{i}. Case 1: f(1i, −1j) = 1. By SSP2, f(1i, 0j) = 1. Case 
1a: f(−1i, 1j) = 0. By SSP2, f(−1i, 0j) = 0 = f(0i, 1j), contradicting EQA2. Case 1b: f(−1i, 
1j) = −1. By SSP2, f(−1i, 0j) = −1, so DIC2 does not hold. Case 1c: f(−1i, 1j) = 1. By 
SSP2, f(0i, 1j) = 1. In view of this, EQA2 does not hold. Case 2: f(1i, −1j) = −1. By SSP2, 
f(0i, −1j) = −1. Case 1a: f(−1i, 1j) = 0. By SSP2, f(−1i, 0j) = 0 = f(0i, 1j) = 1, which 
contradicts EQA2. Case 1b: f(−1i, 1j) = −1. By SSP2, f(−1i, 0j) = −1, so EQA2 does not 
hold. Case 1c: f(−1i, 1j) = 1. By SSP2, f(0i, 1j) = 1. Consequently, DIC2 does not hold. 
Case 3: f(1i, −1j) = 0. By SSP2, f(1i, 0j) = 0 = f(0i, −1j). By cases 1 and 2, f(−1i, 1j) ≠ 0 
leads to a contradiction. Accordingly, f(−1i, 1j) = 0. By SSP2, f(−1i, 0j) = 0 = f(0i, 1j). In 
sum, for all a ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and b ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, f(ai, bj) = υ(ai, bj).?  
 
Proposition 3.8. A social welfare function f satisfies SPD, IND, UNA2, EQA2, DIC2, 
and 
(i) GSP2 if and only if f = μ. 
(ii) SSP2 if and only if f = υ. 
 
Proof. Lemmas 3.3, 3.4 and 3.7.? 
 
Proposition 3.8 establishes that, given SPD, IND, UNA2, EQA2 and DIC2, the choice 
between majority and unanimity can be reduced to the choice between, respectively, the 
group strategyproofness requirement GSP2 and the individual strategyproofness 
condition SSP2 (which is qualified as strong because an indifferent individual is 
presumed to be interested in having the collective preference to be indifference). It is 
somewhat paradoxical that GSP2, a sort of “cooperative” axiom, yields the majority 
rule, which is not particularly cooperative in that not much consensus is needed to reach 
a decision. On the other hand, the rather “non-cooperative” axiom SSP2, yields the 
unanimity rule, which is the quintessential cooperative rule, as overall consensus is 
necessary to reach a decision. 
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